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I. Introduction 
 
At its annual conference in September 2019, the UK Labour Party (then as now in 
opposition) voted in favour of making a manifesto commitment to “integrate all private 
schools into the state sector”.1 The commitment was intended to “include”, but not be limited 
to, inter alia2 the “[w]ithdrawal of charitable status and all other public subsidies and tax 
privileges, including business rate exemption” from such schools, and a commitment for 
private schools’ “[e]ndowments, investments and properties” to be “redistributed 
democratically and fairly across the country’s educational institutions”.  
The suggested removal of charitable status from private schools harks back to “a 
Labour party manifesto promise during the Thatcher years”.3 The party leadership, however, 
distanced itself from the more extreme elements of the conference proposal.4 The manifesto 
ultimately published in advance of the 2019 general election (ostensibly rejected by a 
majority of voters) somewhat qualified and weakened the original language by promising to 
 
* I am grateful to Nathan Tamblyn, Warren Barr and Jamie Glister for social media interactions prompting me to 
write this paper. This paper was presented at a Cambridge Private Law Centre work-in-progress seminar and the 
11th Annual Meeting of the Association for Law, Property and Society at Tulane Law School in 2020. I am 
grateful to attendees, and the anonymous reviewer, for their comments, but remain responsible for all errors.   
1 The Labour Party, “Conference Arrangements Committee: Report 2 to Conference 2019, Sunday 22 
September 2019” (2019), available at http://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/CAC-2-
Final.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1Vfxg7wSLQWpt0CBXKa1ab2GjQu4TyejWxOmBEmToPhH4FM_bEjYI06uE, at p.22.  
2 The motion also sought to “[e]nsure [that] universities admit the same proportion of private school students as 
in the wider population (currently 7%)” (The Labour Party, “Conference Arrangements Committee: Report 2 to 
Conference 2019, Sunday 22 September 2019” (2019), at p.22), a proposal that this paper will not discuss 
further. 
3 D. Morris, “Building a Big Society: Will Charity's Creeping Reach Generate a New Paradigm for State 
Schools?” (2011) 33 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 209 at 217. 
4 H. Zeffman and R. Bennett, “John McDonnell cools on Labour purge of private schools”, The Times, 24 
September 2019, available at https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/john-mcdonnell-cools-on-labour-purge-of-
private-schools-58svvwxcv.  
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“close the tax loopholes enjoyed by elite private schools and use that money to improve the 
lives of all children”, and to “ask the Social Justice Commission[5] to advise on integrating 
private schools and creating a comprehensive education system”,6 even if there was a specific 
commitment to charge value-added tax (VAT) on private school fees.7 It is nevertheless clear 
that the original motion stemmed from the membership’s concerns that the privileges 
associated with attending “private” schools meant that such schools “reflect and reinforce 
class inequality in wider society”.8 It claimed that those who had attended “private” school 
were significantly over-represented in high-profile professions,9 that such school pupils have 
300% more spent on their education than those in “state” schools,10 that “[p]articipation in 
private schooling is concentrated at the very top of the family income distribution”,11 and that 
63% of the public agreed that “it is unfair that some people get a better education and life 
chances for their children by paying for a private school”.12 A majority of conference 
delegates thus sought to “challenge the elite privilege of private schools”.13 The “on-going 
existence of private schools” was said to be “incompatible with Labour’s pledge to promote 
 
5 The Labour Party, “It’s Time for Real Change: The Labour Party Manifesto 2019” (2019), at p.64 pledged to 
“replace the Social Mobility Commission with a Social Justice Commission, based in the Treasury, with wide-
ranging powers to hold us, and future governments, to account”. 
6 The Labour Party, “It’s Time for Real Change: The Labour Party Manifesto 2019” (2019), at p.40. 
7 The Labour Party, “Funding Real Change” (2019), at p.39.  
8 The Labour Party, “Conference Arrangements Committee: Report 2 to Conference 2019, Sunday 22 
September 2019” (2019), at p.22. 
9 The Labour Party, “Conference Arrangements Committee: Report 2 to Conference 2019, Sunday 22 
September 2019”, at p.22, apparently citing Sutton Trust and Social Mobility Commission, “Elitist Britain 2019: 
The educational backgrounds of Britain’s leading people” (2019).  
10 The Labour Party, “Conference Arrangements Committee: Report 2 to Conference 2019, Sunday 22 
September 2019” (2019), at p.22, giving no source but borne out by J. Staufenberg, “Private schools spend three 
times more on each pupil”, Schools Week, 14 October 2016, available at https://schoolsweek.co.uk/private-
schools-spend-three-times-more-on-each-pupil/.  
11 The Labour Party, “Conference Arrangements Committee: Report 2 to Conference 2019, Sunday 22 
September 2019” (2019), at p.22, giving no source but borne out by F. Green et al, “Who Chooses Private 
Schooling in Britain and Why?” (LLAKES Research Paper 62, UCL Institute of Education, 2017).  
12 The Labour Party, “Conference Arrangements Committee: Report 2 to Conference 2019, Sunday 22 
September 2019” (2019), at p.22, citing a Populus poll.  
13 The Labour Party, “Conference Arrangements Committee: Report 2 to Conference 2019, Sunday 22 
September 2019” (2019), at p.22. 
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social justice, not social mobility[,] in education”, and the movement’s opposition to 
“hierarchy, elitism and selection in education”.14 
Rather than focus on the more political questions associated with the existence and 
effect of “private” schools,15 this paper investigates the legal difficulties associated with 
implementing the Labour motion (which, as will become clear, is ambiguous in itself). The 
paper begins by outlining the current status of “private” schools within English charity and 
other law,16 including by considering the very definition of a so-called “private” school. It 
then considers what the effect would be of inter alia removing charitable status from those 
schools, including how a redistribution of their property would compare with the current cy-
près mechanism of redistributing the property of charitable purposes that have “failed”. 
Finally, it considers the potentially significant implications of the proposal for rights 
protected under the European Convention on Human Rights. Such rights include the right of 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions for natural or legal persons (in Article 1 of the First 
Protocol), as well as respect for the rights of parents to ensure education for their children “in 
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions” (in Article 2 of the First 
Protocol).  
Some of the questions asked in this paper, and their possible answers, were 
considered by Joseph Jaconelli in a relatively short article almost a quarter of a century ago,17 
itself critiquing a joint legal opinion on the attenuation of independent schools’ status written 
by Lord Lester and Lord Pannick.18 It is hoped that this paper can nevertheless advance the 
literature by analysing the impact of significant developments in the law of charities since 
1996 (not least the Charities Act 2006 and the consolidating Charities Act 2011),19 the effect 
of withdrawal of fiscal privileges short of deprivation of charitable status, the particular 
proposal to redistribute the relevant schools’ property “across the country’s educational 
 
14 The Labour Party, “Conference Arrangements Committee: Report 2 to Conference 2019, Sunday 22 
September 2019” (2019), at p.22. 
15 The issue is a perennial matter of public debate in the UK: see, e.g., A. Bennett, “Fair Play”, London Review 
of Books, Vol. 36 No. 12, 19 June 2014, available at https://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n12/alan-bennett/fair-play.  
16 This paper will focus on the law in England and Wales rather than in Scotland or Northern Ireland, though on 
occasion reference will be made to the UK as a whole. 
17 J. Jaconelli, “Independent schools, purpose trusts, and human rights” [1996] Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 24. 
18 A. Lester and D. Pannick, “Independent Schools: The Legal Case” (Independent Schools Information Service, 
1991). 
19 Cf. M. Synge, The “New” Public Benefit Requirement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015). 
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institutions”, the implications of Article 1, and the consequences of Article 2 in detail. It will 
also become clear that I depart from Jaconelli on some significant issues. This paper 
highlights that there are considerable potential pitfalls associated with implementing the 
Labour motion, particularly if the UK were to remain a party to the European Convention, 
but that the requirements of the Convention are not as clear cut as they may first appear.  
 
II. The Current Status of “Private” Schools in English Law 
 
(1) What is a “Private” School? 
 
An important prior question is of course the very definition of a “private” school in the 
English context. While it is used in the Labour motion, has much popular resonance,20 and 
has been employed by the judiciary,21 the phrase “private school” does not apparently appear 
in any UK statute.22 The Oxford Dictionary of English defines a “private school” as “an 
independent school supported wholly by the payment of fees”.23 While Labour’s very point is 
that such schools are in fact indirectly supported by the state, “private” and “independent” 
schools are often regarded as synonymous,24 and the latter do at least have a statutory 
definition. Under the Education Act 1996,25 an independent school is defined as “any school 
at which full-time education is provided for” “five or more pupils of compulsory school 
age”,26 or “at least one pupil of that age” with particular needs,27 and “which is not a school 
 
20 See, e.g., The Guardian Online Letters, “Abolishing private schools will make society fairer”, 29 September 
2019, available at https://www.theguardian.com/education/2019/sep/29/abolishing-private-schools-will-make-
society-fairer.  
21 See, e.g., R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2011] UKUT 421 
(TCC) at [29]; [2012] Ch. 214, NG v GA [2019] EWHC 1412 (Fam); [2019] 2 F.L.R. 1223 at [31] per 
MacDonald J. 
22 Cf., e.g., 20 US Code 2393. 
23 A. Stevenson (ed.), Oxford Dictionary of English, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 
p.1413, entry available at 
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199571123.001.0001/m_en_gb0663090?rskey=3Hvp
GU. 
24 See, e.g., Gov.uk, “Types of School”, available at https://www.gov.uk/types-of-school/private-schools. 
25 Education Act 1996, s.463, with some lack of clarity in the drafting. 
26 Essentially 5-16 years: Education Act 1996, s.8. 
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maintained by a local authority” or a “non-maintained special school”. There are apparently 
around 2,500 such schools in the UK, educating around 6.5% of the total number of 
schoolchildren.28 They include junior and senior, day and boarding schools. 
It can perhaps be safely assumed that, by using the term “private” schools, Labour are 
in general referring to “independent” schools as legally understood. The definition of a 
“private” school is not merely of academic interest or merely necessary to delimit the scope 
of this paper. As we will see, it would likely be necessary to change the law of charities by 
legislation to implement Labour’s proposal, and as Jaconelli recognises it would thus be 
“critical” to define precisely what form of educational purpose is no longer to be considered 
charitable, while presumably leaving others within the category.29  
  
(2) Charitable “Private” Schools: Their Status and the Benefits Accruing to Them 
 
Having been essentially judicially defined for centuries, valid charities in England and 
Wales30 must now fall within the statutory definition introduced by the Charities Act 2006 
and consolidated in the Charities Act 2011.31 A “charity” is “an institution which” “is 
established for charitable purposes only”, and “falls to be subject to the control of the High 
Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to charities”.32 There is a two-fold test to 
establish that a purpose is charitable. First, the purpose must fall within a recognised list of 
purposes,33 and “the advancement of education” is one of those.34 Secondly, however, the 
recognised charitable purpose must also be “for the public benefit”,35 and “it is not to be 
 
27 Specifically a pupil for whom an education, health and care plan or a statement of special educational needs is 
maintained, or who is “looked after” (i.e. cared for with or without parental approval) by a local authority. 
28 Independent Schools Council, “Research”, available at https://www.isc.co.uk/research/.  
29 J. Jaconelli, “Independent schools, purpose trusts, and human rights” [1996] Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 24 at 33. 
30 Charity law differs in Scotland: C. Fairburn, “Charitable status and independent schools” (House of 
Commons Briefing Paper No. 05222, 2019), section 6. 
31 A review of the 2006 Act was published in 2012: R. Hodgson, “Trusted and Independent: Giving charity back 
to charities – Review of the Charities Act 2006” (London: Crown, 2012). 
32 Charities Act 2011, s.1(1). 
33 Charities Act 2011, s.2(1)(a). 
34 Charities Act 2011, s.3(1)(b). 
35 Charities Act 2011, s.2(1)(b). 
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presumed that a purpose of a particular description is for the public benefit”.36 On some 
interpretations, this represented a change to the previous position founded on case law, since 
there were indications that public benefit requirement was presumed in relation to charities 
for the relief of poverty, for the advancement of education and for the advancement of 
religion.37 It is the “public benefit” requirement that is the more contentious aspect of 
charitable status, and goes to the heart of the motivation behind Labour’s proposal. Of the 
1,364 schools represented by the umbrella organisation the Independent Schools Council in 
2019, 74% held charitable status and the rest did not (presumably because they could not, or 
did not attempt to, demonstrate compliance with the public benefit requirement).38 While any 
profits made by a charity must be reinvested in furthering its charitable purposes rather than 
being distributed to private individuals,39 it has been claimed that there were over 900 for-
profit schools operating in England in 2016.40  
 The principles surrounding the public benefit requirement as they apply to would-be 
charitable “private” schools were relatively recently considered in detail in R. (Independent 
Schools Council) v Charity Commission for England and Wales.41 The Council asked the Tax 
and Chancery Chamber of the Upper Tribunal to quash parts of the Commission's guidance 
on the public benefit requirement.42 That guidance, inter alia, provided that a valid public 
benefit must not be unreasonably restricted by ability to pay fees and that those in poverty 
must not be excluded from the opportunity to benefit from a charity’s purpose. The Council 
 
36 Charities Act 2011, s.4(2). 
37 See, e.g., Funnell v Stewart [1996] 1 W.L.R. 288 at 295 per Deputy Judge Hazel Williamson Q.C. 
38 Independent Schools Council, “ISC Census and Annual Report 2019” (London: Independent Schools 
Council, 2019) p.7. See R.J. Wilde et al, “Private Schools and the Provision of ‘Public Benefit’” (2016) 45 
Journal of Social Policy 305 on schools’ current attempts to meet the requirement. 
39 Re Resch’s Will Trusts [1969] 1 A.C. 514. Cf. J. Martin and L. Dunlop, “For-profit schools in England: the 
state of a nation” (2019) 34 Journal of Education Policy 726 on the “grey area” in this regard. 
40 J. Martin and L. Dunlop, “For-profit schools in England: the state of a nation” (2019) 34 Journal of Education 
Policy 726 at 729. 
41 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214, noted by B. Sloan, “Public Schools 
for Public Benefit?” [2012] C.L.J. 45. 
42 Charity Commission, “Charities and Public Benefit: The Charity Commission's General Guidance on Public 
Benefit”; Public Benefit and Fee-Charging”; “The Advancement of Education for the Public Benefit” (all 2008 
but superseded in light of the judgment). See now, e.g., Charity Commission, “Analysis of the law relating to 
public benefit” (2017). 
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regarded the guidance as erroneous and over-prescriptive, usurping trustees’ discretion, and 
expressed concern at its uncertainty.43  
Many of the propositions discernible from the Tribunal's lengthy judgment are 
potentially contestable, and political debates on the appropriate understanding of the concept 
of public benefit have continued since the decision.44 It identified two aspects of “public 
benefit”. The first aspect dictates that the nature of the charitable purpose itself must be 
beneficial to the community; the second requires that those who benefit from the purpose 
must be sufficiently numerous to constitute “a section of the public”.45 The case was said to 
be concerned the second aspect, in relation to which “[t]here was, under the pre-[2006] law, 
no presumption at all”.46 The Tribunal was at least highly sceptical, however, about whether 
there was truly a “presumption” in the usual sense of the word in relation to the first aspect 
either before the law was reformed in 2006. In any event, the Tribunal decided that section 
3(2) of the 2006 Act (as it then was) addressed the first aspect only and was therefore 
irrelevant to the particular questions in the ISC case.  
One of the interveners in the ISC case, the Education Review Group, prompted the 
Tribunal to consider some of the very issues later influencing Labour’s 2019 proposal, 
essentially that “private schools have significant ‘disbenefits’ to society in terms, for 
instance, of removing able pupils from state schools and presenting barriers to social 
mobility”.47 The Tribunal held that neither a court nor the Commission could decide the 
political question of whether the public benefit in the first sense provided by independent 
schools was outweighed by the “disbenefits” arising from the charging of fees and the impact 
of independent schools on the public as a whole. It would be difficult, on the Tribunal’s 
analysis, to demonstrate that an otherwise charitable purpose was rendered non-charitable 
because of its wider consequences for society. 
The pertinent question, which the Tribunal saw as unaffected by the 2006 Act or any 
directly binding authority, was whether those able to pay school fees factually constituted a 
sufficient section of the public. The Tribunal distinguished between the purposes and the 
activities of a school. It decided “as a matter of principle” that a trust whose purposes exclude 
 
43 The Attorney-General referred several questions to the Tribunal in the same hearing, and there were two 
interveners. 
44 C. Fairburn, “Charitable status and independent schools” (2019). 
45 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214 at [44]. 
46 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214 at [83]. 
47 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214 at [29]. 
DRAFT – final version to be published in (2021) 138 Law Quarterly Review. 
 
the poor cannot be charitable.48 This means that a school with the sole purpose of educating 
children whose families could afford to pay (substantial) fees representing the cost is not 
charitable. Conversely, a new school “which, as a matter of its constitution, can admit 
students whatever their ability to pay, but as a matter of fact (whether because of a policy of 
accepting only fee paying students or because of some financial imperative) does not do so”49 
would “generally speaking” be exclusively charitable.50 
When considering whether the activities of an existing charitable school are consistent 
with the public benefit requirement, the focus would be primarily on the direct benefits, such 
as scholarships, provided to students. While the sharing of broadly educational facilities with 
state schools could contribute to the satisfaction of the public benefit requirement, the 
Tribunal doubted that making such facilities available to the community as a whole would be 
sufficiently direct to do so unless that somehow implemented an educational object. The 
Tribunal was also somewhat sceptical about the argument that independent schools provide a 
benefit by removing students from the state sector, albeit purporting to adopt an approach 
consistent with Re Resch’s Will Trusts, where the equivalent argument was taken into 
account in the context of a fee-paying hospital.51 
In evaluating whether a school was doing enough to comply with its public benefit-
related duties, the Tribunal held that the correct approach was to examine what a trustee 
would do in the circumstances of the particular school in question, and ask what should be 
done above a necessary de minimis or more-than-token threshold for the poor, although it did 
not obviously settle on a definitive meaning of “poor”. The Tribunal deliberately tried (but 
ultimately failed) to avoid the word “reasonable” in describing the relevant standard, robbing 
it of much content. Fundamentally it was for the “trustees of the school concerned to address 
and assess how their obligations might best be fulfilled in the context of their own particular 
circumstances”.52 Trustees could properly exclude vast numbers of potential beneficiaries, 
provided they did so in a manner that was “rational and justifiable in the promotion of the 
public interest” and without acting capriciously.53 The Tribunal also emphasised the need to 
ensure that facilities were at least ancillary to the advancement of education. 
 
48 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214, at [178]. 
49 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214, at [187]. 
50 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214, at [189]. 
51 Re Resch’s Will Trusts [1969] 1 A.C. 514. 
52 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214, at [217]. 
53 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214 at [218]. 
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Turning to the guidance itself, the Tribunal reluctantly concluded that the 
Commission had sought to impose the very “reasonableness” standard that the Tribunal had 
rejected. Inter alia, the guidance confused aims with activities, wrongly implied that there 
was a necessary obligation to give the poor the opportunity to benefit other than by going 
beyond the de minimis threshold and was sometimes obscure. The Tribunal therefore held 
that several passages of the guidance required correction (ultimately permitting an 
undertaking from the Commission to amend it), although the Tribunal was unable to provide 
the clarity requested by the Council's second submission. 
The conclusion thus appears to empower trustees at the expense of the Charity 
Commission, but the level of uncertainty is considerable. It is telling that the Tribunal was 
subsequently forced to revisit the necessary alterations to the guidance.54 Some of the 
principles enunciated by the Tribunal are questionable. For example, it was widely accepted 
prior to the 2006 Act that there was a presumption of public benefit of some sort in relation to 
educational charities inter alia.55 But it seems unlikely that the judiciary alone, in the absence 
of specific legislation, would reverse the conclusion the activities of a “private” school are 
inherently charitable by their nature (subject to their availability to a sufficient section of the 
population and features such as non-profit-making status). As the Tribunal emphasised in the 
ISC case, “great weight is to be given to a purpose which would, ordinarily, be charitable; 
before the alleged disadvantages can be given much weight, they need to be clearly 
demonstrated”, such that there is “a considerable burden on those seeking to change the status 
quo”.56 Moreover, in the particular context of charitable independent schools, the issues 
raised by the Education Review Group (largely the same as those raised by the Labour Party 
in 2019) were said to be “not really capable of judicial, rather than political, resolution”.57 
Whatever the difficulties with the Tribunal’s judgment, it does demonstrate the extent to 
which the charitable status of many independent schools in England and Wales is currently 
well established in the law. This inevitably has consequences for any proposed removal of 
that status, as desired by the Labour motion. The effect of rendering the provision of 
“private” education “non-charitable” by such legislation is considered in the next part of this 
paper. 
 
54 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission) [2011] 12 WLUK 67. 
55 See, e.g., Explanatory Notes to the Charities Act 2006 at [25]. 
56 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214 at [106]. 
57 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214 at [109]. 
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 The benefits of charitable status, moreover, are considerable. In its evidence to the 
parliamentary Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill, the ISC estimated the value of the 
fiscal advantages of charitable status to its members to be some £88 million,58 which 
“included the value of rates relief, exemption from tax on investment income, tax relief on 
gift aid for donors and relief from corporation tax”.59 The relief on business rates was a 
specific target of the Labour conference motion, and the level of exemption varies according 
to the precise manner in which a building is used but can be total.60 There is also tax relief on 
stamp duty.61 But it is noteworthy that “[c]haritable schools [per se] do not obtain a VAT 
advantage, since education is an exempt supply”.62 Legally speaking, charitable trusts do not 
have to satisfy the beneficiary principle (traditionally holding that a non-charitable trust must 
be able to identify the legal persons who can enforce it and cannot be an abstract purpose 
trust),63 and they are exempt from the rules against perpetual trusts.64 Conversely, regulation 
(most of which is performed in practice by the Charity Commission) is one of the 
disadvantages of charitable status.65 Despite these considerable advantages, it is worth noting 
that, in 2017, the Conservative Government said that: 
 
“No estimates of the sum likely to accrue to the public purse from changing the 
charitable tax status of independent schools have been made. Also, no estimate of 
ending the charitable status of independent schools have been made. Data held on 
charitable tax relief costs cannot be broken down into specific sectors.”66 
 
 
58 Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill, “Evidence From The Independent Schools Council” (2004), 
available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtchar/660/660we83.htm at [11]. 
59 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214 at [34]. 
60 Gov.uk, “Business rates relief: Charitable rate relief”, available at https://www.gov.uk/apply-for-business-
rate-relief/charitable-rate-relief.  
61 National Council for Voluntary Organisations, “Pros and Cons of Becoming a Charity” (2017), available at 
https://knowhow.ncvo.org.uk/setting-up/setting-up-a-charity/charitable-
status/pros_and_cons_of_becoming_a_charity. 
62 R. (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission [2012] Ch. 214 at [34]. 
63 See, e.g., Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Vesey Junior 522; 32 E.R. 947. 
64 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009. 
65 National Council for Voluntary Organisations, “Pros and Cons of Becoming a Charity” (2017).  
66 UK Parliament, “Private Education: Taxation: Written question – 1926”, available at 
https://www.parliament.uk/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/commons/2017-06-29/1926.  
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In any case, it would in principle be possible to remove some of the benefits of charitable 
status from currently charitable independent schools without taking away their fundamental 
status as charities, and this is currently under consideration in Scotland.67 One way through 
which a “redistribution” of assets might be prompted would be through increased tax 
revenues collected from charitable private schools. Even non-charitable schools providing the 
currently VAT-exempt service of education could be subject to such a “redistribution” if (for 
example) that exemption were to be removed. There is a precedent in the variation of the 
specific rules applied to charities, as illustrated by the fact that ecclesiastical corporations and 
certain related bodies are not considered “charities” for certain purposes under the 2011 
Act.68  
The removal of all (or almost all) benefits for currently charitable “private” schools 
for all (or almost all) purposes would, however, surely lead to allegations that they are 
effectively being deprived of their status, unless all charities were to be subject to the same 
deprivations. At that point, as Jaconelli recognised, “there would be little (if any) point in 
demarcating charity as an independent heading”.69 In some circumstances, even changes to 
the tax regime falling some way short of the removal of charitable status could raise issues 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, as discussed in the last substantive section 
of this paper. 
 The following section, however, discusses the removal of charitable status and the 
redistribution of their property as a matter of “purely” domestic English Law. 
  
III. The Removal of Charitable Status and the Redistribution of Property in Domestic 
Law 
 
The next important question to be addressed by this paper is what the Labour proposal means 
by “integration” of “private” schools into the state sector. At least the removal of charitable 
status and the redistribution of assets are clearly contemplated, but does this mean that the 
provision of education by “independent” schools is to be made unlawful? Even if “private” 
schools’ activities themselves are to remain permissible, it is difficult to see how independent 
 
67 K. Barclay, “Report of the Barclay Review of Non-Domestic Rates” (Scottish Government, 2017); Non-
Domestic Rates (Scotland) Bill. 
68 Charities Act 2011, s.10. 
69 J. Jaconelli, “Independent schools, purpose trusts, and human rights” [1996] Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 24 at 26. 
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schools could realistically operate without their assets, such that the effect of confiscation and 
redistribution would in substance render private education unlawful, although a “fair” and 
“democratic” redistribution might arguably stop short of stripping “private” schools of all 
their assets. Would the name (with its key connection to reputation) of a school count as a 
relevant “asset” to be redistributed, in addition to the more obvious land, endowment or 
income? Are “private” schools essentially to be made state schools by being nationalised? 
The answers to these questions are not rendered remotely clear by the Labour motion. This 
paper therefore begins the analysis by considering the scope for, and implications of, the 
removal of charitable status per se. As will be seen in the next sub-section, this could give 
way naturally to redistribution of assets through the cy-près system as currently understood, 
albeit that the system may need to be modified in order to accomplish Labour’s objective. 
 The notion that a particular sort of activity that was once charitable can cease to be so 
has some precedent in English Law.70 For example, in National Anti-Vivisection Society v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners,71 the House of Lords decided that the Society was not 
charitable, inter alia, because the benefits of vivisection outweighed the detriment. This was 
despite an earlier decision in Re Fouveaux72 that organisations that were either “the 
predecessors” of the Society or “substantially identical for all relevant purposes”73 were 
indeed charitable. While Synge supportably argues that this change was because of an error 
of law by failing to weigh benefit and detriment to the community in Re Foveaux in the first 
place,74 that does not change the basic fact that the decision demonstrates that it is possible in 
principle for a purpose once regarded as charitable to cease to be so. 
Interestingly, it is not only the Labour Party that has in recent years threatened 
“private” schools (or at least some of them) with a withdrawal of charitable status. In 2016, 
the Conservative Government consulted on proposals to require independent schools to 
provide further benefit to pupils in the state sector, such as by setting up or sponsoring a new 
school or offering funded places.75 The Government proposed to “set new benchmarks that 
independent schools are expected to meet” in that regard, “in line with their size and 
 
70 See also, e.g., The City of London Rifle and Pistol Club, The Burnley Rifle Club (1993) 1 Decisions of the 
Charity Commissioners 4. 
71 National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] A.C. 31. 
72 Re Fouveaux [1895] 2 Ch. 501. 
73 National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] A.C. 31 at 42 per Lord Wright. 
74 M. Synge, The “New” Public Benefit Requirement (2015), at p.49. 
75 Department for Education, “Schools that work for everyone: Government consultation” (Crown, 2016).  
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capacity”, and said that the Government would “consider legislation to ensure that those 
independent schools that do not observe these new benchmarks cannot enjoy the benefits 
associated with charitable status”.76 A consultation response was published in May 2018, but 
the response document does not appear to mention charitable status at all.77  
 In light of the appetite in several quarters for removal of the charitable status of at 
least some schools, the next sub-section of this paper considers how a redistribution of 
“private” schools’ assets might compare with, or even be accommodated within, the existing 
system for redistributing the property of charities whose purposes have “failed”.  
  
(1) A Comparison with Cy-près 
 
For much of the history of charity law, the jurisdiction has existed to redistribute the property 
of a charity whose charitable purpose has “failed”. This is known as cy-près, with its origins 
in a Law-French term meaning “as near as possible”, and the notion of “failure” has 
expanded over time.78 In the context of this paper, the relevant question is how, if at all, the 
doctrine might apply to an organisation, specifically a school, whose purposes are fairly 
clearly charitable under the present law but would cease to be any longer, or how else such an 
organisation’s property might be redistributed.  
The current cy-près rules can come into operation for a variety of reasons, now 
governed by section 62 of the 2011 Act, the most relevant being where a purpose has 
“ceased, as being useless or harmful to the community or for other reasons, to be in law 
charitable”.79 Questionably, however, Jaconelli alternatively asserts that “[o]n the termination 
of charitable status, the beneficial interest in the schools’ property would vest by way of 
resulting trust in a multitude of persons and bodies”,80 or, if no relevant beneficiary could be 
 
76 Department for Education, “Schools that work for everyone: Government consultation” (2016), at [14]. 
77 Department for Education, “Schools that work for everyone: Government consultation response” (Crown, 
2018). 
78 See, generally, R.P. Mulheron, The Modern Cy-près Doctrine: Applications & Implications (London: 
Routledge, 2016). 
79 Charities Act 2011, s.62(e)(ii). 
80 J. Jaconelli, “Independent schools, purpose trusts, and human rights” [1996] Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 24 at 28. 
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identified by virtue of being potentially void non-charitable purpose trusts,81 albeit that the 
latter might be saved by the operation of the principle in Re Denley whereby particular 
human legal persons are identified as beneficiaries notwithstanding the fact that a trust’s 
objects are specified as purposes.82 Jaconelli assumes that “pupils, parents and teachers, 
governors” would be the human beneficiaries able to enforce the trust if a Re Denley analysis 
were to be employed in this context,83 though it is surely arguable that at least governors are 
more appropriately regarded as trustees per se. He also accepts that a previously charitable 
school could take a different form to avoid the rules on private purpose trusts.84 Perhaps 
oddly, it is only after this assertion that he goes on to consider cy-près, seemingly because in 
his view there was nothing in the precursor to section 62 of the Charities Act 2011 to prevent 
the application of the default purpose trust rule, and also that a private educational institution 
is not “useless or harmful to the community”.85 Synge is surely correct to argue that it is only 
where a trust was never charitable that principles of trust law should apply, and that the 
correct approach where a charity becomes non-charitable is for the trustees to apply for a cy-
près scheme.86 Consistently, Tudor on Charities opines that: 
 
“If a particular charitable purpose is declared by statute to be no longer charitable, any 
property held for that purpose will be applicable cy-près under s.[62](1)(e)(ii)], 
covering circumstances where the purpose “ceased, as being useless or harmful to the 
community or for other reasons, to be in law charitable”...Similarly, where a purpose 
becomes no longer charitable because of a change in social circumstances…property 
held for that purpose will be applicable cy-près.”87 
 
 
81 J. Jaconelli, “Independent schools, purpose trusts, and human rights” [1996] Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 24 at 29. 
82 [1969] 1 Ch. 373. 
83 J. Jaconelli, “Independent schools, purpose trusts, and human rights” [1996] Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 24 at 29. 
84 J. Jaconelli, “Independent schools, purpose trusts, and human rights” [1996] Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 24 at 30. 
85 J. Jaconelli, “Independent schools, purpose trusts, and human rights” [1996] Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 24 at 31, citing Charities Act 1993, s.13(1)(e)(ii). 
86 M. Synge, The “New” Public Benefit Requirement (2015), at p.54. 
87 W. Henderson and J. Fowles, Tudor on Charities, 10th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), at [10-065]. 
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In cy-près terms, if the rules are indeed applicable, property already held by a 
charitable school would be subject to the rules on so-called “subsequent failure”, and thus not 
generally (subject to express provision in the gift’s terms) be returnable to those who 
provided it.88 It would be particularly controversial for schools to lose their privileges and for 
their donors to lose control of their assets in this manner. Matters would be different, 
however, in the case of a gift to a charitable school that has essentially ceased to exist by the 
time the gift is able to come into effect. An example would be where a former pupil makes a 
gift in a will to a school, and neglects to update it after Labour implement their policy. 
Depending on the particular mechanism chosen to implement the policy, the people otherwise 
entitled to the would-be donor’s estate may be able to argue that they are entitled to the gift 
because the intended donee no longer exists, the gift is thus the subject of a so-called “initial 
failure” and the donor lacked the “general charitable intent” usually89 required for the 
property to be applied cy-près because he was specifically motivated to give the property to 
the particular school that he attended.90 
Charities currently take many forms, including companies; charitable incorporated 
organisations; charities incorporated by Act of Parliament, by Royal Charter, by grant of 
letters patent, by persons acting under Royal licence, by prescription, by a lost Charter being 
presumed, or by custom; community benefit societies; unincorporated associations; or trusts 
(only the last two of which are unincorporated).91 But in cases of “subsequent” failure, the 
particular form of the charity may not have a particularly significant impact on the 
application of its property. That said, there are specific rules relating to the application of cy-
près in the case of charities “governed by charter, or by or under statute”.92 Synge has also 
argued that the cy-près doctrine’s “application in the context of companies is debateable” for 
reasons including the fact that a company is the beneficial owner of its assets, even if she 
concedes that the differential treatment of charities based on their structure is “a situation 
 
88 Re Wright [1954] Ch. 347. 
89 Cf. Charities Act 2011, s.63, which broadly allows property to be applied cy-près even when there is no 
general charitable intent if the donor cannot be identified or found or has disclaimed his rights to have the 
property returned.  
90 See, e.g., Re Rymer [1895] 1 Ch. 19. 
91 Law Commission, Technical Issues in Charity Law A Consultation Paper (Consultation Paper 220, 2015), at 
[1.13ff]. 
92 Charities Act 2011, s.68. 
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which would be unlikely to find judicial favour”.93 In Liverpool and District Hospital for 
Diseases of the Heart v Attorney-General, Slade J held that: 
 
“…the so-called rule that the court's jurisdiction to intervene in the affairs of a charity 
depends on the existence of a trust, means no more than this: the court has no 
jurisdiction to intervene unless there has been placed on the holder of the assets in 
question a legally binding restriction, arising either by way of trust in the strict 
traditional sense or, in the case of a corporate body, under the terms of its 
constitution, which obliges him or it to apply the assets in question for exclusively 
charitable purposes.”94 
 
Moreover, the fact that Re Finger’s Will Trusts (for example) set down the principle that a 
“general charitable intent” is less likely to be found in the case of a corporate body surely 
suggests that cy-près would otherwise be generally applicable to them.95 
Ultimately, the fact that the removal of charitable status would almost certainly have 
to occur by legislation means that such the redistribution of property from charities taking 
various forms would (presuming competent drafting) be dealt with in any event, including if 
necessary a modification of the 2011 Act’s general inclusion of a purpose “recognised as 
charitable purposes…under the old law” within the current understanding of a charitable 
purpose.96 That said, Synge accepts that there is a potentially difficult relationship between 
cy-près and removal of a charity from the register,97 and that matters are especially 
complicated where the charity has taken the form of a company.98 It should be noted, 
however, that: 
 
“Certain charities are exempt from the requirement to register with the Charity 
Commission, and from other (but not all) provisions of the Charities Act 2011. They 
 
93 M. Synge, The “New” Public Benefit Requirement (2015), at p.55. 
94 Liverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v Attorney-General [1981] Ch. 193 at 214. 
95 Re Finger’s Will Trusts [1972] Ch. 286. 
96 Charities Act 2011, s.3(1)(m). 
97 M. Synge, The “New” Public Benefit Requirement (2015), at p.54. 
98 M. Synge, The “New” Public Benefit Requirement (2015), at p.55. 
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are usually regulated by another body (the ‘principal regulator’) whose functions 
overlap with those of the Commission.”99 
 
Significantly for present purposes, exempt charities include100 a further education 
corporation, a qualifying Academy proprietor, the governing body of any foundation, 
voluntary or foundation special school, a relevant “foundation body” and a sixth form college 
corporation, such that these institutions would not be removed from the register of charities. 
  Jaconelli describes the operation of cy-près in relation to a charitable school in these 
circumstances as “a respect in which the holding, followed by the loss, of charitable status is 
less advantageous than never to have had the status”.101 Such is the nature of cy-près. In the 
case of a non-charitable school, the fate of its property would be determined by its legal 
structure. It should also be borne in mind that, if a non-charitable school is an unincorporated 
association, it is now likely that the property would go to the “members” by virtue of the 
“contract holding theory”,102 despite earlier authority that such property might revert either to 
the donor on resulting trust to the donor or as bona vacantia to the Crown.103 Analogously 
with the Re Denley argument considered above, the “membership” of the association would 
have to be determined for these purposes, and the same candidates of pupils, teachers, parents 
and perhaps governors are likely to be considered. Once the membership is established, a 
principle of division would generally be applied with a starting point of equal division being 
implied in the absence of an express term, though it should be noted that there is a tendency 
in the case law for minors to be treated less favourably than adult “members”.104 
Whatever the details and consequences of the structure, a mechanism other than cy-
près would have to be devised for the state to be able to redistribute a non-charitable 
“private” school’s property to other institutions, and such a mechanism may raise issues 
under the European Convention (discussed in detail in the next section of this paper). In 
 
99 Law Commission, Technical Issues in Charity Law A Consultation Paper (2015), at [1.26]. 
100 Charities Act 2011, sch.3, paras.7-11. 
101 J. Jaconelli, “Independent schools, purpose trusts, and human rights” [1996] Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 24 at 30.  
102 See, e.g., Re Horley Town Football Club [2006] EWHC 2386 (Ch); [2006] W.T.L.R. 1817. 
103 Re West Sussex West Sussex Constabulary's Widows, Children and Benevolent (1930) Fund Trusts [1971] 
Ch. 1. 
104 Re Horley Town Football Club [2006] W.T.L.R. 1817; Re GKN Bolts & Nuts Ltd etc Works Sports and 
Social Club [1982] 1 W.L.R. 774. 
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Hanchett-Stamford v Attorney General,105 it was specifically held that for the property of an 
unincorporated association to revert to the Crown because there was only one remaining 
member of a non-charitable unincorporated association would be a prima facie breach of 
Article 1 of the Convention’s First Protocol. That said, there are established circumstances 
when a dissolved company’s assets will pass to the Crown as bona vacantia,106 even if this 
should currently happen only where “assets or property are [not] transferred or dealt with 
before a company is dissolved”.107 
As for Jaconelli’s argument that a “private” school is not by nature “useless or 
harmful to the community” such that its property cannot be subject to cy-près, Labour’s 
premise is that such a school is precisely so harmful, and in any event section 62 also 
expressly covers situations where a purpose ceases to be charitable for “other reasons”. If 
section 62 were to have the effect suggested by Jaconelli and preclude the operation of cy-
près it would surely be reworded. There are precedents for this kind of statutory manipulation 
notwithstanding the general definition of a charity, and despite Meakin’s claim of a “general 
principle that charitable objects cannot cease to be charitable because they have become 
outdated or impractical”.108 Even now, “[p]articular statutes deem particular kinds of 
institution to be or not to be charities when they would or might otherwise come within or not 
come within the general definition”.109 An example is that a “registered sports club” 
established for charitable purposes is (by virtue of the Charities Act 2011) to be treated as not 
being so established, such that it is deemed not to be a charity.110  
Another “drafting” point is that many independent schools (or the trusts etc. 
constituting them) arguably perform charitable functions other than the advancement of 
education, such as the advancement of religion111 or the prevention or relief of poverty.112 
 
105 Hanchett-Stamford v Attorney General [2008] EWHC 330 (Ch); [2009] Ch. 173. 
106 Companies Act 2006, s.1012. 
107 Government Legal Department, “Bona vacantia dissolved companies (BVC1)” (2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bona-vacantia-dissolved-companies-bvc1/bona-vacantia-
dissolved-companies-bvc1#avoid-bona-vacantia.  
108 R. Meakin, The Law of Charitable Status: Maintenance and Removal (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), at p.108. 
109 W. Henderson and J. Fowles, Tudor on Charities, 10th edn (2015), at [1-005]. 
110 Charities Act 2011, s.6. 
111 See, e.g., St Mary and St Michael Parish Advisory Co Ltd v Westminster Roman Catholic Diocese Trustee 
[2006] EWHC 762 (Ch); [2006] W.T.L.R. 881. 
112 See, e.g., Cawdron v Merchant Taylors' School [2009] EWHC 1722 (Ch); [2010] W.T.L.R. 775. 
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Assuming that those would remain valid charitable purposes per se even if Labour’s proposal 
were implemented, care would have to be taken to avoid those being a “back door” through 
which many independent schools could potentially retain charitable status. 
 There is a further fundamental matter that would have to be considered if the 
redistribution of charitable schools’ property is to be effected “across the country’s 
educational institutions”. It is, quite simply, that the current understanding of cy-près would 
mean that schools’ property would go to charitable purposes that remained so (and were thus 
palatable). Once one of the circumstances in section 62 is activated, a scheme is devised to 
govern the application of the relevant property under section 67 of the 2011 Act. The cy-près 
scheme is devised by the court or the Charity Commission, which have the power to “make a 
scheme providing for the property to be applied” “for such charitable purposes”,113 and “(if 
the scheme provides for the property to be transferred to another charity) by or on trust for 
such other charity”,114 “as it considers appropriate”.115 In making its decision, the court or 
Commission must have “regard”116 to “the spirit of the original gift”,117 “the desirability of 
securing that the property is applied for charitable purposes which are close to the original 
purposes”,118 and “the need for the [recipient] charity to have purposes which are suitable and 
effective in the light of current social and economic circumstances”.119 In addition, the court 
or Commission may “impose on the charity trustees of [the recipient] charity a duty to secure 
that the property is applied for purposes which are, so far as is reasonably practicable, similar 
in character to the original purposes”.120 
Under the current law, it would be relatively uncontroversial for assets from a 
dissolved independent school to be applied cy-près for the benefit of another charitable 
school. This is true despite the issues relating to general charitable intent discussed above, 
and potential debates about the suitability and effectiveness of the recipient school in the 
prevailing social and economic circumstances. But matters will be more complicated if 
private education is no longer to be regarded as charitable but the intended recipients of 
 
113 Charities Act 2011, s.67(2)(a). 
114 Charities Act 2011, s.67(2)(b). 
115 Charities Act 2011, s.67(2). 
116 Charities Act 2011, s.67(2). 
117 Charities Act 2011, s.67(3)(a). 
118 Charities Act 2011, s.67(3)(b). 
119 Charities Act 2011, s 67(3)(c). 
120 Charities Act 2011, s 67(4). 
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previously charitable property are state schools. A related complication is that the Labour 
proposal clearly seeks the removal of charitable status from “private” schools but may 
contemplate such schools retaining some (though not all) of their property. This is clearly 
allowed to happen as a matter of practice under the existing law in relation to individual 
schools that lose their charitable status through insufficient “public benefit” provision.121 To 
allow all such schools to retain property in the event that private education is rendered non-
charitable in principle, however, is not necessarily compatible with the current understanding 
of cy-près.  
A change in the legal nature of cy-près and/or state or “private” schools themselves 
might therefore be necessary to achieve Labour’s aim. A dizzying array of types of state 
school exists.122 For present purposes, despite Morris’s assertion that “[c]haritable 
status…has long been associated with state schools,”123 it is significant that “community 
schools, controlled by the local council and not influenced by business or religious groups”124 
are prevented by legislation from being charitable.125 Other types of state school, by contrast, 
are automatically charitable.126 Essentially, Labour would have to make all state schools 
charities in order to allow them to receive property via cy-près, limit the types of schools that 
are so to receive such property, change the fundamental nature of cy-près so that it did not 
mandate the transfer of previously charitable assets to other charities or charitable purposes 
per se, or redistribute the assets via a mechanism other than cy-près (which may be 
tantamount to compulsory acquisition by the state). These mechanisms might well have 
differing consequences for Article 1 of the First Protocol. In addition, of course, whichever 
mechanism is chosen would have to leave intact the very object of the exercise, i.e. to render 
the provision of private education non-charitable. Some elements of the Labour Party do not, 
however, appear to be shying away from a fundamental reorganisation of the school system, 
since another motion approved at the 2019 conference sought to stop “all academisations and 
 
121 See, e.g., C. Turner, “Private schools abandon charitable status in bid to avoid ‘huge pressure’ to deliver 
‘public benefit’”, The Telegraph, 27 April 2018, available at 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/2018/04/27/private-schools-abandon-charitable-status-bid-avoid-huge-
pressure/. 
122 Gov.uk, “Types of School”, available at https://www.gov.uk/types-of-school. 
123 D. Morris, “Building a big society: will charity's creeping reach generate a new paradigm for state schools?” 
(2011) 33 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 209 at 210. 
124 R. Long, “The School System in England” (House of Commons Briefing Paper No. 07169, 2017), at p.3. 
125 School Standards and Framework Act 1998, s.23.  
126 School Standards and Framework Act 1998, s.23.  
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the opening of academies and free schools”,127 with academies128 and free schools129 being 
funded by the Government but not controlled by local authorities. The rendering of more 
state schools as charitable would in any case, and somewhat ironically, continue a process 
that Morris identified as increasing by virtue of the 2010-2015 coalition government’s so-
called “Big Society” policy that aimed to increase the role of the private sphere relative to the 
state in providing services.130  
Ultimately, it is likely to be possible to achieve the Labour motion’s aims, whether 
amounting to nationalisation, a removal of charitable status or something falling short of that, 
as a matter of domestic law. But it is likely to require both extremely careful drafting in order 
to target the very precise “mischief” identified without also undermining it, as well as 
potentially fundamental changes to the law of charities, the nature of state schools and 
perhaps even property law more generally. Even if appropriate mechanisms are devised as a 
matter of purely domestic law,131 however, the next section of this paper considers the 
potentially very significant implications of the European Convention on Human Rights for 
the policy agreed at Labour’s conference. 
 
IV. The Implications of the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Any breach of the European Convention in the context of education policy would be 
politically as well as legally significant since, in contrast to the ambiguity of the currently 
governing Conservative party,132 Labour apparently remain “firm[ly]” committed to the UK 
remaining a party to the Convention and the status granted to it in domestic law via the 
 
127 The Labour Party, “Conference Arrangements Committee: Report 2 to Conference 2019, Sunday 22 
September 2019” (2019), at p.16. 
128 Gov.uk, “Types of School”, available at https://www.gov.uk/types-of-school/academies.  
129 Gov.uk, “Types of School”, available at https://www.gov.uk/types-of-school/free-schools.  
130 D. Morris, “Building a big society: will charity's creeping reach generate a new paradigm for state schools?” 
(2011) 33 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 209. 
131 Cf. Human Rights Act 1998. 
132 Conservatives, “Get Brexit Done: Unleash Britain’s Potential: The Conservative and Unionist Party 
Manifesto 2019” (2019), at p.48. 
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Human Rights Act 1998.133 The particular articles at issue in this paper, however, are two of 
those whose inclusion in the Convention was most controversial.134 
 
(1) Article 1 of Protocol 1 
 
Article 1 provides: 
 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.” 
 
Allen notes that “[e]ven a cursory glance reveals that [Article 1 of the First Protocol] was not 
drafted with care”,135 including via the changing language between “property” and 
“possessions”. It is interpreted as containing three distinct but connected rules, albeit that 
“modern case-law takes a very similar approach to all forms of interferences with property 
rights”.136 Whatever its difficulties, Article 1 could be of significance if the state were to try 
to appropriate independent schools’ property, even if the bare text of the Article may make it 
appear as though a school has little in the way of complaint about any attempted confiscation 
and redistribution of its property.  
An immediate issue is that the structure of a school could affect the very applicability 
of Article 1, since a charitable company is likely to be the beneficial owner of its assets137 but 
 
133 The Labour Party, “It’s Time for Real Change: The Labour Party Manifesto 2019” (2019), at p.65. 
134 See, e.g., N. Wahlström, “The Struggle for the Right to Education in the European Convention on Human 
Rights” (2009) 8 Journal of Human Rights 150, at 150-51. 
135 T. Allen, Property and The Human Rights Act 1998 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), at p.8. 
136 B. Rainey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights, 7th edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), at p.577. 
137 See, e.g., M. Synge, The “New” Public Benefit Requirement (2015), at p.54. 
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the same is not necessarily true of a charitable trust.138 Article 1 applies to “natural” and 
“legal” persons, and there may therefore be doubt as to whether a charitable trust even falls 
within that definition since a trust does not have a separate legal personality as a matter of 
English Law.139 Meakin has gone as far as to suggest that “[i]t could be argued that charitable 
institutions themselves do not have rights under the Human Rights Act 1998”.140 On the other 
hand, he later asserts that “[t]here is little doubt that charities own their property whether it is 
held on trust or in the case of a charitable company beneficially for its charitable purposes”, 
and that “[i]t is also clear that charities, whether incorporated or unincorporated, will be 
natural or legal persons within the wording of Article 1, Protocol 1”.141 Whether charities are 
relevant “persons” is intermingled with whether they have relevant “possessions” and, as it 
was put by Rainey, “[i]t is for the Strasbourg organs to determine what falls within the 
concept of possessions in the Article having regard to the classification of the matter under 
national law”.142 National law is not therefore conclusive,143 and the meaning of 
“possessions” has been described as “autonomous”.144 In Holy Monasteries v Greece, the 
applicant monasteries complained that laws facilitating the compulsory transfer of some of 
their property to the state violated Article 1, even though domestic law treated them treated 
them as public authorities.145 The Court agreed that they were non-governmental 
organisations, and that there was a “deprivation” of property for the purposes of Article 1. 
 Even if a school were to be considered a relevant legal person with relevant 
“possessions”, the text of Article 1 still appears to present considerable difficulties for a 
school arguing that the measures considered earlier in this paper would bring about a breach. 
It is implicit in the Labour proposal that it would be very much “in the public interest” for 
“private” schools to be deprived of their possessions and for those possessions to be 
redistributed to other schools. The mechanisms discussed in the previous section of this paper 
would presumably be “conditions provided for by law”, and Article 1 seeks not to “impair” 
 
138 See, generally, I. Dawson and J. Alder, “The nature of the proprietary interest of a charitable company 
or a community interest company in its property” (2007) 21 Trust Law International 3. 
139 See, e.g., L. Tucker et al, Lewin on Trusts, 19th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), at [3-071]. 
140 R. Meakin, The Law of Charitable Status: Maintenance and Removal (2008), at p.131 
141 R. Meakin, The Law of Charitable Status: Maintenance and Removal (2008), at p.137. 
142 B. Rainey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights, 7th edn (2017), at p.551 
143 See, e.g., Depalle v France Application (2012) 54 E.H.R.R. 17. 
144 See, generally, T. Allen, “The autonomous meaning of 'possessions' under the European Convention on 
Human Rights” in E. Cooke (ed.), Modern Studies in Property Law: Volume 2 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003). 
145 Holy Monasteries v Greece (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 1. 
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“in any way” a state’s right to “enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property” either “in accordance with the general interest” or “to secure the payment of taxes”. 
The redistribution of schools’ property would again serve that interest in the view of a 
government seeking to implement the Labour proposal. A lesser withdrawal of charitable 
status would, moreover, secure the payment of taxes specifically protected under Article 1. 
Article 1, however, may be more powerful than it first appears: Allen asserts that “the 
desire to apply overarching principles relating to discrimination and legality…led the 
[Strasbourg] Court to conclude that it would review laws imposing taxes [under P1-1], 
despite the conceptual distinctions between liabilities and property rights”.146 Allen is clear, 
following James v United Kingdom,147 that a “fair balance test applies to all interferences 
with possessions”, and that “[t]he second and third sentences…lay down criteria relevant to 
the fair balance, but other criteria may be relevant as well”.148 He also asserts that “some of 
the jurisprudence on proportionality developed with respect to other Convention rights can be 
applied to P1(1)”.149 So even if something is lawful it may still be subjected to a 
proportionality analysis, and “[t]he legality principle is so easily satisfied that the doctrine of 
proportionality now performs some of the functions that might have been left to it” and 
“[s]imilarly, the identification of the Rule is of questionable importance, since it seems to 
have little impact on the outcome of the case”.150 
While there is a measure of deference to the national legal system as to what is 
“lawful”,151 relevant “lawfulness” requires “the existence of and compliance with adequately 
accessible and sufficiently precise domestic legal provisions”.152 The law must be accessible 
and predictable to comply with the legality requirement.153 In Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi v 
Turkey, which involved a foundation whose purpose was to provide educational facilities at a 
Greek Orthodox High School in Istanbul,154 the European Court emphasised that the relevant 
 
146 T. Allen, Property and The Human Rights Act 1998 (2005), at p.33. 
147 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 123. 
148 T. Allen, Property and The Human Rights Act 1998 (2005), at p.124. 
149 T. Allen, Property and The Human Rights Act 1998 (2005), at p.124. 
150 T. Allen, Property and The Human Rights Act 1998 (2005), at p.165. 
151 Beyeler v Italy (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 52. 
152 Grudić v Serbia [2012] ECHR 708 at [74].  
153 T. Allen, Property and The Human Rights Act 1998 (2005), at pp.96-100. 
154 Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi v Turkey (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 15. 
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measure must be “sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable”.155 On the facts, the 
foundation acquired title to part of a building, but title was nullified at the behest of the 
Treasury, on the basis that the foundation did not have the required legal capacity to hold 
immovable property because such capacity was not provided for in its constitution. Even 
though Article 1 does not guarantee the right to acquire property and “[t]here is no doubt that 
Contracting States should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in regulating the acquisition of 
land and other immovable property by legal entities such as foundations”,156 the European 
Court held that: 
 
“…the annulment of the title to the property in question, pursuant to case-law adopted 
sixteen and twenty-two years respectively after its acquisition, was not foreseeable for 
the applicant foundation. It could not reasonably have foreseen that its title, obtained 
many years earlier, would one day be annulled because of a new judicial 
interpretation of the applicable legislation, which in fact remained silent as to its 
capacity to acquire property.”157 
 
There was thus no “lawfulness”, and the Court found a breach. There may be an argument 
that an extension of cy-près, via a removal of one of the major charitable purposes (namely 
the provision of private education) as previously understood after many centuries, would 
similarly fail to comply with requirements of predictability, foreseeability and precision. That 
said, cy-près in general is a well-established mechanism and a well-drafted and well-
publicised statute (as distinct from a judicial volte-face thought unlikely in the previous 
section of this paper) might be able to ensure compliance in this regard. Any attempted 
“abolition” of “private” schools may nevertheless be considered relevantly “unpredictable” in 
light of the rights protected under Article 2 of the First Protocol (considered in the next sub-
section of this paper), even if it is hardly likely to be described as arbitrary given that it is 
based on a particular ideology-driven policy. There may also be an issue founded on a 
legitimate expectation that the benefits associated with charitable status are expected to 
continue, based on the controversial treatment of a disability pension in Béláné Nagy v 
 
155 Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi v Turkey (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 15 at [50]. 
156 Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi v Turkey (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 15 at [52]. 
157 Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi v Turkey (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 15 at [57]. 
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Hungary,158 particularly given that the withdrawal of charitable status would not be “due to 
any changes in the [complainant]’s own circumstances, but to changes in the law or its 
implementation”.159 
Even if “lawful”, the measure at issue must also pursue a “legitimate aim” in the 
“public interest” for the purposes of Article 1. It has been said that “the margin of 
appreciation available to the legislature in the choice of policies should be a wide one, and its 
judgment as to what is ‘in the public interest’ should be respected unless that judgment is 
manifestly without reasonable foundation”.160 The attempt to secure greater equality within 
society, clearly motivating the Labour proposal, is presumably unlikely to be considered 
something “manifestly without reasonable foundation” as a legitimate objective in the public 
interest. In the House of Lords in Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, Lord Hope opined that Parliament’s decision to exclude a private (but 
nevertheless charitable) place of worship from a full non-domestic (or business) rate 
exemption was “within the discretionary area of judgment accorded to it by” Article 1’s 
second paragraph.161 The fiscal benefits currently associated with charitable status would 
presumably mean that the state would in general pursue a legitimate aim in the public interest 
by seeking to regulate what did and did not count as charitable, and Meakin suggests that 
while “[t]he loss of tax reliefs following removal from the register would, prima facie, 
amount to a breach of Article 1, Protocol 1”, “it is arguable that the taxation of charities 
would be held to fall within the margin of appreciation allowed to member states as the tax 
relates to social and economic factors”.162  
Any interference, however, “must also be reasonably proportionate to the aim sought 
to be realised”.163 This means an interference with peaceful enjoyment of possessions “must 
strike a ‘fair balance’ between the demands of the general interests of the community and the 
 
158 Béláné Nagy v Hungary [2016] ECHR 1114. 
159 European Court of Human Rights, “Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Protection of property” (Council of Europe, 2019), at [54]. 
160 Grudić v Serbia [2012] ECHR 708 at [75]. 
161 Gallagher (Valuation Officer) v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints [2008] UKHL 56; [2008] 1 
W.L.R. 1852 at [31]. The decision was upheld in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v United Kingdom 
(2014) 59 E.H.R.R. 18 without substantive consideration of Article 1 of the First Protocol. 
162 R. Meakin, The Law of Charitable Status: Maintenance and Removal (2008), at p.138. Cf. the consequences 
if an organisation that was never charitable were to be erroneously registered as a charity and its property 
applied cy-près: W. Henderson and J. Fowles, Tudor on Charities, 10th edn (2015), at [10-064]. 
163 Grudić v Serbia [2012] ECHR 708 at [76]. 
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requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights”, and there “must be a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be realised by any measure depriving a person of his possessions”.164 In particular, “[t]he 
requisite balance will not be found if the person or persons concerned have had to bear an 
individual and excessive burden”.165 It may be arguable that there are other means of 
promoting equality in society by ensuring that state schools provide a sufficiently high-
quality education and/or are adequately funded, and that redistributing the property of 
“private” schools to achieve the aim, rather than (for example) increasing taxation generally, 
excessively targets “private” schools. A possible counter-argument, of course, is that 
“private” schools are numerous such that their burden is not “individual”, particularly if no 
such school could operate under the implemented regime, and that the burden is not 
“excessive” in light of their direct contribution to the supposed inequality. There would 
nevertheless be an irony in the suggestion that the abolition of all “private” schools would be 
a more proportionate response than making it difficult or impossible for a few of them to 
operate. 
An important consideration as regards proportionality is that “the taking of property 
without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a 
disproportionate interference and a total lack of compensation can be considered justifiable 
under Article 1 (P1-1) only in exceptional circumstances”, even if “Article 1…does not… 
guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances”.166 It is not clear how this 
compensation principle would apply in the context of redistributing “private” schools’ 
property. Since it is the very wealth of the schools that is being targeted, rather than only their 
specific buildings etc., the policy would be fatally undermined if the Government 
immediately had to compensate them at market rate (or even near it) for property taken. If 
schools were to be abolished or nationalised, moreover, it is uncertain whom the appropriate 
recipients of any compensation would be, which goes back do the difficulties over legal 
structures considered earlier. It may be, therefore, that a deprivation of property amounting to 
redistribution to other schools could realistically never be considered proportionate, even if 
the general charitable intention proviso discussed above would protect the rights of donors in 
ensuring at least some of the time that their property reached the intended recipient, which is 
 
164 Holy Monasteries v Greece (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 1 at [70]. 
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potentially significant given that A1-P1 also protects the right to dispose of one’s property.167 
On the other hand, it may be possible to make the completely countervailing argument: in the 
event that a charitable school had to close down even in the context of the current legal 
regime, the cy-près mechanism is well established, and neither donors, officers, pupils nor 
fee-payers could reasonably expect to benefit from those assets. In the event of a closure, of 
course, parents etc. could reasonably expect to obtain a refund of fees paid for an education 
not provided in accordance with a (potentially frustrated)168 contract, but thus not otherwise. 
It is not necessarily therefore clear that any natural person has an expectation of 
compensation, and (subject to a challenge to the whole nature of cy-près) it may be difficult 
to argue that there is any point in a school receiving compensation if it is to be prevented 
from operating anyway. In addition, if a prohibition of independent schools and the 
consequent redistribution of their assets is essentially regarded as a “nationalisation”, there is 
likely to be a wide margin of appreciation as regards compensation.169  
In any event, it should be noted that the relevant measure could be classed as a mere 
control of use of the schools’ property, rather than a deprivation per se, as in Pye v United 
Kingdom,170 even if Rainey asserts that “[t]he [Strasbourg] Court has brought together the 
tests it applies in relation to deprivations, the control of the use of property, and to other 
interferences with property, so that the questions the Court will ask in each of these 
circumstances raise essentially the same issues”.171 The significance of such a classification 
as a control of use is that it would “side-step…” the issue of compensation.172 It has been said 
that “[f]orfeiture and confiscation are regarded by the Court as control of use of property, to 
be considered under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 despite the obvious 
fact that they entail a deprivation of ‘possessions’”.173 Harsh as it sounds, “forfeiture” and 
“confiscation” may be the appropriate characterisation of the expropriation of “private” 
 
167 Marckx v Belgium (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 330. 
168 See, e.g., H.G. Beale (gen. ed.), Chitty on Contracts, 33rd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2018), at [23-
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Private Law (Cambidge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at p.286. 
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schools’ property, if they are deemed no longer to be carrying out a lawful purpose. Meakin 
argues that “[c]harity [as a whole] will not be deprived of its property and will still control its 
use” in the event of application cy-près, “although the purposes for which the property can be 
used will have changed”.174 This will not be much comfort for an individual school, however, 
and the argument put on behalf of the state may not hold if (as considered above) that school 
is regarded as a legal person with its own property rights for the purposes of the Convention, 
such that at the very least its use of property is controlled. In any event, Rainey implies that a 
measure controlling a school’s use of property is likely to be permissible so long as it has the 
character of law, is in the general interest or has the purpose of securing the payment of taxes, 
and is deemed necessary by the state.175 This would be a very light-touch approach, leaving a 
school with little in the way of redress. 
It has been seen that the application of Article 1 to the redistribution of “private” 
schools’ property, which itself could take several forms, involves many twists and turns. 
While a breach may not ultimately be found, the possibility for argument surrounding several 
of Article 1’s provisions makes legal wrangling surrounding it fairly inevitable if a Labour 
Government were to press ahead with the conference-agreed policy. 
 
(2) Article 2 of Protocol 1 
 
Article 2 of the Convention’s First Protocol provides: 
 
“No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions 
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the 
right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions.” 
 
Schabas makes the dramatic claim that “[d]uring the drafting of the European Convention 
and Protocol No. 1, more attention was devoted to the provision on the right to education 
than to any other right”, with the difficulties mainly relating to “the struggle between 
 
174 R. Meakin, The Law of Charitable Status: Maintenance and Removal (2008), p.137. 
175 B. Rainey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights, 7th edn (2017), at p.572. 
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universal public education and the protection of private systems, generally of a confessional 
nature”.176 
It is immediately clear that, for the purposes of this sub-section of the paper, the focus 
must shift from mainly “private” schools themselves towards the children they educate and 
the parents of those children. At first glance (of the text), it might be thought difficult to 
sustain a claim that even the outright abolition of “private” schools could breach Article 2. 
Labour are by no means proposing to deny any child an education, and in fact seek to have a 
levelling effect on the standard of education provided by removing particular advantages 
apparently conferred by “private” schools. Moreover, it is not particularly convincing to 
argue that a desire to pay for a child’s education, separated off from “state” pupils albeit still 
at school, at an institution with all the privileges and property rights described elsewhere in 
this paper, itself represents a “cogent” philosophical conviction, even if the European Court 
of Human Rights has recognised “that overcrowded classes can be detrimental to the 
effectiveness of the education system in a way which hinders the specific training 
experience”.177 A relevant philosophical conviction does not, for example, even include a 
linguistic preference,178 and it is not clear that private education per se falls within the 
“confessional” issues generally at the core of Article 2 cases as described by Schabas.  
As Schabas notes,179 Ireland specifically made a declaration on signing the First 
Protocol that Article 2 was “not sufficiently explicit in ensuring to parents the right to provide 
education for their children in their homes or in schools of the parents’ own choice, whether 
or not such schools are private schools or are schools recognised or established by the 
State”.180 In his partially dissenting opinion in Cosens v United Kingdom, Sir Vincent Evans 
opined that if an opposition to corporal punishment is recognised (as it was by the majority in 
that case) as a relevant philosophical conviction for the purposes of Article 2, he did not see 
“how it can reasonably be applied so as to exclude from its scope all manner of other strongly 
held views regarding the way in which schools are organised”, including “the existence of 
independent schools”.181 But in regard to such matters, he identified “insuperable practical 
 
176 W.A. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University 
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difficulties in respecting equally the views of those who are opposed to and those who favour 
one system or the other”.182  
In Kjeldsen v Denmark, however, albeit rejecting the substantive complaints of 
parents regarding compulsory sex education, the Court emphasized that “[t]he second 
sentence of Article 2 aims in short at safeguarding the possibility of pluralism in 
education”.183 Citing this case, Rainey opines that “it would seem that there is a right of 
persons to establish private schools”.184 Similarly, Wahlström finds within the case a 
responsibility placed on states “to permit private schools approved by the government”.185 On 
Rainey’s analysis, Article 2’s protection of parental choice “allows parents either to enrol 
their children in State education, to withdraw their children from the State system and 
educate them privately whether at a private school or at home”.186 The guide to Article 2 
published by the Council of Europe, moreover, asserts that “Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 
guarantees the right to open and run a private school, but the States do not have a positive 
obligation to subsidise a particular form of teaching”.187 Lonbay, by contrast, cites Kjeldsen 
in support of the proposition that Article 2 does not per se prevent a state monopoly in 
education, and it is for this reason that he does not regard a parent’s views on private 
education as potentially giving rise to a breach even if recognised as a philosophical 
conviction.188 While there is considerable ambiguity in the judgment, Lonbay’s view may not 
be tenable in light of the Court’s emphasis on the fact that the Convention’s travaux 
préparatoires “indisputably demonstrate…the importance attached by many members of the 
Consultative Assembly and a number of governments to…freedom to establish private 
schools”.189  The European Court appears to suggest that this freedom is a minimum 
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guarantee, augmented by respect for parental religious and philosophical convictions even 
within state teaching. 
Even if Article 2 does not protect a right to private education per se, as a matter of 
practical reality a state may well struggle to provide a range of educational services, as 
distinct from simply facilitating the provision of education incorporating particular “religious 
and philosophical convictions” by at least quasi-independent institutions. On Lonbay’s 
analysis, although Article 2 “does not necessarily prevent a State monopoly in educational 
provision”, this is “providing that such education and teaching respects parental religious and 
philosophical conviction” and, while “[i]t may be possible for a State to satisfy all parental 
convictions within the State system”, “it could prove difficult and expensive”.190 On Rainey’s 
analysis, whether the obligation to accommodate education according to parental 
philosophical or religious beliefs “would extend to the funding, or even partial funding, of 
private schools where this is the only way in which respect for particular convictions could be 
secured is, as yet, an unanswered question”.191 Meakin, on the other hand, opines that “[i]f 
the closure of [independent] schools or application of their property cy-près” following 
removal from the register of charities “led to a loss of pluralism, including the right of parents 
to ensure that the education and teaching for their children was in conformity with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions”, “then it is arguable that there might be a breach of 
Protocol 1, Article 2 and discrimination under Article 14”.192 In fact, the opinion of Lord 
Lester and Lord Pannick, as paraphrased by Jaconelli, was that “any change in the law which, 
even indirectly, forbids the continued existence of independent schools constitutes a breach 
of the European Human Rights Convention”.193 The European Court itself has said that “the 
fundamental right of everyone to education is a right guaranteed equally to pupils in State and 
independent schools, without distinction”.194  
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As Schabas notes, however, “although article 2 ‘has no stated exceptions’, it is not an 
absolute right, and finds itself subject to implied limitations”.195 The Court has emphasised 
that Article 2 “cannot be interpreted as imposing a duty on the Contracting States to set up or 
subsidise particular educational establishments”, even if “any State doing so will be under an 
obligation to afford effective access to them”.196 “Private” schools are an example of the sorts 
of institution that a state is not obliged to subsidise.197 The right of “access” is to “educational 
institutions existing at a given time”,198 which might be said to relieve states of any 
responsibility to ensure that particular educational institutions, or forms thereof, continue to 
exist.199 It might even preserve states’ freedom positively to ensure that a particular (form of) 
institution no longer exists, given that regulation of education by the state “may vary in time 
and place according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals”.200 The 
notion of “respect” for the purposes of Article 2 “cannot be interpreted to mean that parents 
can require the State to provide a particular form of teaching”.201 There is no “right to 
education [such] as would require [states] to establish at their own expense, or to subsidise, 
education of any particular type or at any particular level”.202 Significantly: 
  
“As the first sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2) taken by itself leaves intact 
the freedom of States to subsidise private schools or to refrain from so doing, the 
withdrawal of subsidies from schools which do not satisfy the requirements to which 
the State subjects the grant of such subsidies…does not come within the scope of this 
Article (P1-2).”203 
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It may be also be significant, however, that on the facts of the Belgian Linguistic Case where 
this pronouncement was made, the measures complained of did not “prevent French-speaking 
parents who wish to provide a French education for their children from doing so, either in 
non-subsidised private schools” or in a different region, and “in no way affect the freedom to 
organise, independently of subsidised education, private French-language education”.204 If 
the freedom to ensure education similarly according to parental preference were in substance 
curtailed via implementation of another policy (such as the one embodied in Labour’s 
proposal), however, matters may be different. 
 The implications of Article 2 for Labour’s proposal are not, therefore, particularly 
clear. The withdrawal of at least some fiscal privileges associated with charitable status 
would be permissible. The explicit abolition of private schools would probably amount to a 
violation. The real difficulty, however, is ascertaining at what point (if at all) the first of these 
becomes tantamount to the second, particularly in circumstances where “private” schools 
already both exist and receive subsidies. A Labour Government would have to tread 
extremely carefully in prejudicing the future operation of private schools if it wished the UK 
to remain a party to the European Convention, particularly if it struggled to ensure sufficient 
pluralism in state-provided education. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that the removal of charitable status from “private” independent 
schools and/or the redistribution of their assets to other schools may be possible, but would 
be fraught with legal difficulties. It would clearly require legislation, and fundamental 
changes to the law of charity, the law of property and/or the legal status of at least some 
existing non-”private” schools as well as “private” ones themselves. It may also violate the 
European Convention on Human Rights, particularly if the removal of charitable status 
and/or redistribution of assets would in substance prevent independent schools’ continued 
operation. But the ECHR implications are not, according to the analysis undertaken in this 
paper, nearly as clear-cut as some previous commentators have suggested. If any future 
Government (Labour or otherwise) were to remain wedded both to a policy of redistributing 
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schools’ assets and to one of remaining a party to the Convention, that Government would in 
any case have to act very cautiously indeed. 
 The removal of certain benefits of charitable status, falling fairly considerably short of 
removing the status altogether, would be significantly easier, in the sense that it would 
necessitate fewer fundamental changes charity or education law and reduce the scope for 
challenge. But it would still require legislation and risk violating the European Convention 
unless carried out very carefully. Ultimately, this paper has cast light on dangerous 
uncertainty not only in the Labour Party’s 2019 proposal, but also in the law of charities and 
the European Convention. 
